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Brain mechanisms of hypnosis are poorly known.
Cognitive accounts proposed that executive atten-
tional systems may cause selective inhibition or
disconnection of some mental operations. To assess
motor and inhibitory brain circuits during hypnotic
paralysis, we designed a go-nogo task while volun-
teersunderwent functionalmagnetic resonance imag-
ing (fMRI) in three conditions: normal state, hypnotic
left-handparalysis, and feignedparalysis.Preparatory
activation arose in right motor cortex despite left
hypnotic paralysis, indicating preserved motor inten-
tions, but with concomitant increases in precuneus
regions that normally mediate imagery and self-
awareness. Precuneus also showed enhanced func-
tional connectivity with right motor cortex. Right
frontal areas subserving inhibition were activated
by nogo trials in normal state andby feignedparalysis,
but irrespectiveofmotorblockadeorexecutionduring
hypnosis. These results suggest that hypnosis may
enhance self-monitoring processes to allow internal
representations generated by the suggestion to
guide behavior but does not act through direct motor
inhibition.
INTRODUCTION
Volition to action is a fundamental feature of our subjective expe-
rience of intentionality. Yet, understanding the cerebral mecha-
nisms of volition remains rudimentary. Various brain disorders
may disrupt motor actions or motor intentions, implicating a
wide network of cortical and subcortical regions responsible for
initiating, planning, executing, and monitoring one’s actions (Frith
et al., 2000). Some psychiatric conditions, such as conversion
disorder (Halligan et al., 2000b; Vuilleumier et al., 2001) and
schizophrenia (Blakemore et al., 2003; Frith, 2005), may result862 Neuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.from uncoupling the execution of movements from the subjective
experience of voluntary control over actions. However, changes
in the functional relations between volition and action can also be
induced in healthy people, typically by using hypnotic suggestion
(Blakemore et al., 2003).
Hypnosis is thought to involve a distortion of consciousness,
with heightened suggestibility and diminished peripheral aware-
ness (Spiegel and Spiegel, 1978), which can induce various
changes in perception, emotion, thought, or behavior. Popular
views consider hypnosis as a ‘‘sleep-like state’’ in which an indi-
vidual acts like an automaton, under the command of a will other
than his/her own. In contrast, contemporary scientific accounts
have proposed that hypnotic effects might reflect an engagement
of specific cognitive processes mediating executive and atten-
tional control (Crawford, 1994;Gruzelier, 1998).Thus, an influential
model (Oakley, 1999) suggests that hypnosis might correspond to
‘‘the withholding of representations from entry into self-aware-
ness.as the result of the inhibition by the central executive
system’’ of motor or cognitive processes that to the individual
are experienced as willed actions or, alternatively, due to some
disconnection between executive control and awareness systems
(Hilgard, 1974). This model was supported by studies (Blakemore
et al., 2003; Haggard et al., 2004) showing that the subjective
experience of willing an action can be excluded from awareness
by hypnotic induction (e.g., leading to a dissociation between
subjective reports of intention to move and actual movement).
However, the neural substrates underlying such changes in exec-
utive control have not yet been identified.
More recently, functional neuroimaging was used to investi-
gate the neural mechanisms implicated in some effects of
hypnosis (Egner et al., 2005; Faymonville et al., 2000; Kosslyn
et al., 2000; Rainville et al., 1997; Raz et al., 2005; Szechtman
et al., 1998), but most studies focused on pain perception. This
pioneer work showed that hypnosis may either reduce or
enhance the intensity of experienced pain for physically identical
stimuli, in parallel with a modulation of regions in the anterior
cingulate cortex (ACC) that encode the affective value of pain
(Rainville et al., 1997). However, a modulation of ACC by hypnosis
might also reflect the key role of this region in attention and exec-
utive control (Carter et al., 1999; Turken and Swick, 1999). In
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hypnosis on selective attention using Stroop tasks and reported
either decreases or increases in ACC depending on the sugges-
tion (Egner et al., 2005; Raz et al., 2005).
Few imaging studies investigated hypnotic effects on other
functions. Although these studies elegantly demonstrated an
impact of suggestion on neural activity underlying voluntary
movement (Halligan et al., 2000a; Ward et al., 2003), color
perception (Kosslyn et al., 2000), or memory (Mendelsohn et al.,
2008), none directly tested for a ‘‘causal’’ role of inhibition or
disconnection of executive control systems in producing these
neural changes. Pioneer work on hypnotic leg paralysis (Halligan
et al., 2000a; Ward et al., 2003) found that a lack of activation in
motor cortex during attempted movements with the affected
leg was associated with concomitant increases in ACC and
orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) and concluded that the latter activa-
tions might be responsible for inhibiting motor cortex. However,
it is unclear whether such inhibition involves nonconscious
processes specific to hypnosis or bear some similarity with other
mechanisms responsible for voluntary inhibitory control in normal
(nonhypnotic) conditions. Furthermore, rather than having a
causal role in inhibition, the ACC and OFC increased activities
during hypnosis might at least partly reflect the important function
of these regions in processing conflicts and motivational choices,
in keeping with the discrepancy between hypnotic suggestion of
paralysis and instructions to move (de Lange et al., 2007).
Here, we used fMRI to directly test whether a hypnotic sugges-
tion of paralysis may activate specific inhibitory processes
and whether these may or may not correspond to those respon-
sible for inhibition in nonhypnotic conditions. We designed a go-
nogo paradigm that allowed us to compare these different types
of inhibition within a single task. Go-nogo paradigms have been
extensively used to study motor inhibition and are known to
recruit selective brain regions, particularly the right inferior frontal
gyrus (IFG; see Aron et al., 2004b; Garavan et al., 1999). More-
over, the right IFG mediates inhibition for a wide range of
behaviors, including not only prepotent responses but also inap-
propriate thoughts (Anderson et al., 2004) or memories (Depue
et al., 2006). In our study, by comparing performance in a go-nogo
task under normal conditions and under hypnotic suggestion of
paralysis for one hand, we could determine whether voluntary
inhibition of an action (e.g., no-go condition for a ‘‘normal’’
hand) and hypnotic paralysis (e.g., go condition for a ‘‘paralyzed’’
hand) would share similar neural mechanisms (i.e., activation of
right IFG or ACC). In addition, our go-nogo task was combined
with a motor preparation phase, during which subjects had to
prepare a hand movement prior to the imperative GO or NOGO
cue. If hypnotic paralysis involves a suppression of motor
intention, then the preparation phase should evoke no motor acti-
vation for the paralyzed hand (and no subsequent inhibition).
Alternatively, if hypnotic paralysis involves an active inhibition
of willed movement (Halligan et al., 2000b), then activation of
motor and premotor areas should arise normally during prepara-
tion, while inhibitory activity should arise at the time of execution
(e.g., left go trials should actually correspond to the no-go condi-
tions). Furthermore, based on the idea that hypnosis may induce
a functional dissociation between discrete brain networks (Egner
et al., 2005; Jamieson and Sheehan, 2004), we tested for anychange in the functional connectivity of motor regions during
hypnosis and normal state. Importantly, to determine effects
specific to hypnosis, we compared a group of subjects during
hypnotic paralysis with a group of subjects instructed to simulate
paralysis without hypnotic suggestion.
Our results reveal that hypnotic paralysis differs from active
voluntary motor inhibition but selectively modulates activity in
brain areas involved in self-monitoring and attentional control,
decreasing functional connectivity of the primary motor cortex
with premotor areas while increasing connectivity with regions
in precuneus that are associated with mental imagery and self
representations.
RESULTS
All participants performed a go-nogo task using both hands (see
Experimental Procedures). Each trial began with a preparation
cue (black-and-white picture of a right or left hand), indicating
the side to prepare the upcoming movement (PREP condition).
Then, the hand picture could turn either green or red: when
green, participants had to press a button as quickly as possible
with the corresponding hand (GO condition, 75% of trials); but
when red, the prepared movement had to be withheld (NOGO
condition, 25% of trials).
A group of participants (n = 12) performed this task in a normal
state for two consecutive blocks and in a hypnotic state for two
other consecutive blocks (order counterbalanced). During
hypnosis, subjects received a suggestion that their left hand
was paralyzed, prior to performing the task and starting fMRI
scans (see Experimental Procedures).
A control group (n = 6) performed the same task but with the
instruction to simulate a left-hand paralysis. They were told to
act ‘‘as if’’ they were suffering from motor weakness and unable
to move their fingers. This simulation group provided an impor-
tant control for the possibility that hypnosis could be feigned
and paralysis voluntarily produced in the previous group.
Behavioral Performance
In the normal state, participants correctly responded with both
hands for GO (97.4%) as well as NOGO conditions (96.9%).
During hypnosis and simulation, performance was also highly
accurate with the right hand for GO (97.9% and 95.8%, respec-
tively) and NOGO trials (97.5% and 96.4%, respectively),
whereas no movement was made with the left hand (Table 1),
indicating successful hypnotic suggestion and compliance with
our instruction in the two groups. Likewise, RTs on correct GO
trials with the right hand were similar in all conditions (normal
state, hypnosis, or simulation; Table 1). ANOVAs and paired
t tests on accuracy and RT data showed no significant difference
between hands in the normal state and between states for the
right hand (all pairwise comparisons, t < 1, for both RTs and error
rates). These behavioral data demonstrate that hypnosis did not
impair the task performance for the nonaffected hand.
fMRI Data
Our design allowed us to test for two main hypotheses on the
neural mechanisms of hypnotic motor paralysis. First, by exam-
ining brain activity during the preparation phase, we couldNeuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 863
Neuron
Voluntary Inhibition during Hypnotic ParalysisTable 1. Behavioral Performance
L Hand R Hand
Normal Hypnosis Simulation Normal Hypnosis Simulation
RT (ms) 442 0 0 435 439 439
(±SD 11) (±SD 11) (±SD 10) (±SD 17.6)
Errors (%) 2.9 0.1 0 2.2 2.2 3.75
(±SD 0.6) (±SD 0.1) (±SD 0.3) (±SD 0.5) (±SD 1.8)determine whether hypnotic induction acted by suppressing
motor intentions or by inhibiting movements still normally in-
tended for the left hand. Second, by comparing induced paralysis
on go and no-go trials, we could determine whether any active
inhibition of the left hand during hypnosis (on go trials) might
implicate similar neural processes as the voluntary suppression
of a prepared movement (on no-go trials). Alternatively, hypnosis
might act on motor function through a distinct modulation or
disconnection of executive control systems (Egner and Raz,
2007), in particular the putative inhibitory processes mediated
by IFG and ACC (Aron et al., 2004b; Halligan et al., 2000b).
Movement Preparation under Hypnosis
To test whether hypnotic paralysis affected motor preparation,
we examined brain activity during the presentation of the
PREP cues, for one or the other hand (R-PREP > L-PREP, and
conversely). In the normal state, there was a reliable activation
of motor cortex (M1), contralateral to the hand being prepared
(Figure 1 and Table 2A). The same pattern was found during
hypnosis and simulation (Table 2). For the hypnosis group, a
2 (hand-side) 3 2 (state) ANOVA on parameter estimates of
activity (betas) from the right M1 showed a main effect of hand-
side [F(1,11) = 39.49, p < 0.001] but no significant effect of state
and no interaction [F(1,11) < 1.34, n.s.]. For simulation relative to
normal state, a similar 2 (hand-side) 3 2 (group) ANOVA also
showed a main effect of hand [F(1,11) = 24.54, p < 0.001], with
no interaction [F(1,11) = 0.25, n.s.]. Thus, despite left hypnotic
paralysis or simulation, participants still normally activated their
right M1 during preparation of a left-hand movement, indicatingthat they could still generate covert motor plans and correctly fol-
lowed task instructions (Toni et al., 1999). However, preparation
of the left hand also activated a second cluster in somatosensory
cortex under both hypnosis and simulation (Table 2), not in the
normal state (z score = 1.18, n.s. for the same coordinates).
In addition, the same contrast (L-PREP > R-PREP) showed
a selective increase in the precuneus for movement preparation
with the left/paralyzed hand during hypnosis (Figure 1 and Table
2A). By contrast, in the normal state and simulation condition, as
well as for the right hand under hypnosis, activity in this region
was generally low and similar for both hands (L-PREP versus
R-PREP in normal state: z score = 0.31; simulation: z score =
1.06; both n.s.). This differential activity across hands and condi-
tions suggests a specific involvement of the precuneus in the
hypnotic suggestion concerning the left hand (see Figure 1).
Finally, direct contrasts between hypnosis and normal condi-
tions (for right or left hand preparation separately) revealed higher
activity in visual areas and right middle temporal gyrus irrespective
of the hand used (Table 2B). Thesedirectcontrasts also confirmed
the absence of significant differences in motor cortex for either
side (right, xyz = 39, –30, 54, z score = 0.89; left, xyz = –42, –18,
45, z score = –0.27, both n.s.) but selective increases in the precu-
neus for the left hand only during hypnosis (Table 2B) and not for
the right hand (left precuneus peak: xyz = –3, –63, 57, z score =
0.31; right peak: xyz = 9, –63, 45, z score = 1.12, both n.s.).
Motor Execution
Next, we identified activations produced by motor execution (in
normal conditions) or attempted movements (under hypnosis)Figure 1. Activation during Preparation
Phase
Regions showing an increase in the PREP condi-
tion for the right > left/paralyzed hand (left section
of the figure) and for the left/paralyzed > right hand
(right section of the figure) in normal state (red),
hypnosis (yellow, p < 0.001 uncorrected, k = 20
voxels), and simulation (green, p < 0.005 uncor-
rected, k = 40 voxels). Plots represent parameter
estimates (beta values, error bars represent ±1
SEM for each column) for L-PREP (pink) and
R-PREP (blue) in normal (NO), hypnosis (HYPNO),
and simulation (SIM) conditions. Bilateral and
symmetric activations can be seen in primary
motor cortex in all cases. Increases in precuneus
were observed under hypnosis for the left hand
selectively (see text). Additional activity in somato-
sensory cortex was also seen during hypnosis and
simulation.
864 Neuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
Neuron
Voluntary Inhibition during Hypnotic ParalysisTable 2. SPM Results for the Motor Preparation Phase
A. Hemisphere Brain Region x y z Z Value
NO: L-PREP > R-PREP
R motor cortex 39 30 54 4.57
NO: R-PREP > L-PREP
L motor cortex 42 18 45 4.34
L SMA 6 15 45 3.79
L thalamus 6 15 12 3.56
HYPNO: L-PREP > R-PREP
R motor cortex 27 30 60 4.83
R precuneus 9 63 57 4.36
R precentral gyrus 39 15 51 4.33
R S1 42 39 51 4.21
R inferior parietal lobule 54 33 30 3.61
HYPNO: R-PREP > L-PREP
L motor cortex 39 18 51 4.55
SIM: L-PREP > R-PREP
R motor cortex 45 12 60 3.08*
R inferior parietal lobule 45 45 54 4.21
SIM: R-PREP > L-PREP
L motor cortex 45 30 54 3.03
R middle frontal gyrus 39 33 3 4.34
L middle temporal gyrus 54 63 12 3.78
L posterior insula 39 21 15 3.73
L superior temporal gyrus 57 39 15 3.62
R ventral premotor cortex 57 6 18 3.34
B. Hemisphere Brain region x y z Z Value
L-PREP: HYPNO > NO
R precuneus 9 63 45 5.03
L precuneus 3 63 57 4.2
R lingual gyrus 3 90 12 4.46
R middle temporal gyrus 45 54 0 4.78
L thalamus 15 6 15 4.7
R precentral gyrus 51 9 39 4.18
R-PREP: HYPNO > NO
R lingual gyrus 6 81 3 4.36
R middle temporal gyrus 48 60 0 3.97
R thalamus 18 21 3 4.77
NO, normal state; HYPNO, left hypnotic paralysis; SIM, left simulated paralysis, *k = 5 voxels instead of 20.by comparing GO relative to NOGO trials, for each hand sepa-
rately (Table 3A). These analyses showed that left motor networks
(including left M1 and right cerebellum), were significantly
recruited by right-hand movements (R-GO > R-NOGO) with
a similar response in all conditions (normal, hypnosis, or simula-
tion; Figure 2 and Table 3A). For the hypnosis group, a 2 (task-
condition)3 2 (state) ANOVA on betas from the left M1 confirmed
a main effect of task-condition [F(1,11) = 220,37, p < 0.001] with no
significant effect of state and no interaction [F(1,11) < 4.17],
whereas for simulation relative to normal state, a 2 (task-condi-
tion)3 2 (group) ANOVA showed a main effect of task-condition
[F(1,11) = 125.06, p < 0.001] but no interaction [F(1,11) < 4.10].By contrast, left motor execution (L-GO > L-NOGO) activated
motor areas (including right M1 and left cerebellum) in the normal
condition only (Figure 2 and Table 3A). The same comparison
during hypnotic paralysis showed no such motor increases
(Table 3A; z score = 1.03, n.s. for right M1 peak), consistent
with the lack of executed movement on L-GO (Table 1). Accord-
ingly, in the hypnosis group, the 2 (condition) 3 2 (state) ANOVA
for right M1 activity revealed a significant interaction [F(1,11) =
53.22, p < 0.001], together with main effects of condition
[F(1,11) = 97.48, p < 0.001] and state [F(1,11) = 10.26, p = 0.008].
Likewise, for simulation relative to normal state, a 2 (condi-
tion) 3 2 (group) ANOVA also showed a significant interactionNeuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 865
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A. Hemisphere Brain Region x y z Z Value
NO: R-GO > R-NOGO
L motor cortex 33 18 63 4.57
L insula 57 12 9 3.69
HYPNO: R-GO > R-NOGO
L motor cortex 54 24 51 5.6
R motor cortex 57 15 48 5.05
R inferior parietal lobule 63 30 21 4.89
L SMA 3 15 51 4.88
L anterior cingulate cortex 6 33 21 4.03
SIM: R-GO > R-NOGO
L motor cortex 48 12 51 3.93
R inferior precentral gyrus 48 0 27 4.15
NO: L-GO > L-NOGO
R motor cortex 51 24 60 5.41
L insula 42 3 9 4.44
L motor cortex 51 30 60 4.36
L cuneus 3 69 30 4.31
R insula 36 6 9 3.85
R post-ACC 3 3 33 3.84
HYPNO: L-GO > L-NOGO
L middle occipital gyrus 24 99 3 4.08
L lingual gyrus 24 90 12 3.81
SIM: L-GO > L-NOGO
R ACC 15 30 39 4.11
B. Hemisphere Brain Region x y z Z Value
R-GO: HYPNO > NO
n.s.
L-GO: HYPNO > NO
L inferior frontal gyrus 42 12 18 3.95
L superior frontal gyrus 3 36 57 3.71
NO = normal state; HYPNO = left hypnotic paralysis; SIM = left simulated paralysis.[F(1,11) = 54.46, p < 0.001] and a main effect of condition [F(1,11) =
36.50, p < 0.001] but no effect of group [F(1,11) < 4.01].
Activation of Inhibitory Networks during Hypnotic
and Feigned Paralysis
Importantly, no other activation was specifically evoked under
hypnosis for L-GO relative to NOGO trials, except for some
increases in visual areas (Table 3A). However, if hypnotic paral-
ysis results from active inhibition of motor outputs (Marshall
et al., 1997), a key prediction would be that GO trials should elicit
a distinct pattern of activation for the left/paralyzed hand so as to
stop motor commands that were still normally prepared in motor
cortex (see above). Accordingly, activity on left GO trials could
possibly become similar to left NOGO trials. We therefore
compared the execution phase for one hand versus the other
(L-GO > R-GO and vice versa), to identify any activation specific
to attempted movements with the left/paralyzed hand under
hypnosis. As expected, right movements were found to produce
increases in the contralateral left M1 (xyz = –51, –27, 54, z score =866 Neuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.4.67, p < 0.001), whereas left ‘‘inhibited’’ movements produced
no response in right M1 (xyz = 51, –24, 60, z score = –0.20, n.s.)
but selective increases in the left prefrontal areas (xyz = –42, 12,
36, z score = 3.93, p < 0.001). Critically, however, there was no
activation of brain regions typically associated with cognitive
or motor inhibition, such as the right IFG (Aron and Poldrack,
2006; Garavan et al., 1999; Kawashima et al., 1996; Konishi
et al., 1999) or ACC, even at liberal threshold (see also below
and Figure S1B available online). These results indicate that
motor circuits were ‘‘silent’’ during GO trials for the left/paralyzed
hand, with no evidence for active inhibition of motor commands.
Finally, direct whole-brain contrasts between hypnosis and
normal state also showed that the L-GO condition evoked
higher activity in left prefrontal areas under hypnosis, including
the inferior and superior frontal gyri (Table 3B). Again, there
was no other activation. No significant difference was found
for the R-GO conditions across the whole brain (including for
direct comparison in left motor cortex, peak xyz = –42, –18,
45, z score = 1.05, n.s.).
Neuron
Voluntary Inhibition during Hypnotic ParalysisBy contrast, during feigned paralysis, the left GO condition
(compared to R-GO) activated a distinct network of regions
including the right IFG (peak xyz = 60, 24, 27, z score = 2.98,
p = 0.001), as well as the right IPL (peak xyz = 63, –45, 36, z score =
3.08, p = 0.001), partly overlapping with activations during normal
voluntary inhibition, as we could further establish in the next
analysis of NOGO trials (see below and Figure S1C).
Voluntary Motor Inhibition
To identify brain regions specifically activated by motor inhibi-
tion, we compared NOGO versus GO trials. In the normal state,
this contrast revealed a bilateral but right predominant network
involving IFG, posterior middle frontal gyrus (post-MFG) gyrus,
and IPL (Figure 3 and Table 4 for details), consistent with
previous work on motor or cognitive inhibition (Chambers
Figure 2. Activations of the Primary Motor Cortex during Motor Execution
Regions showing an increase to GO compared to NOGO trials in the normal state for the left (red) and right (yellow) hands (p < 0.001 uncorrected, k = 20 voxels).
Plots represent the betas for L-GO and R-GO (yellow), plus L-NOGO and R-NOGO (blue) trials, respectively, in the normal, hypnosis, and simulation conditions.
Error bars represent ±1 SEM for each column. Consistent with induced paralysis of the left hand, no right motor activation was observed during hypnosis and
simulation for L-GO conditions, whereas the left primary motor cortex was activated for R-GO in all three conditions (see text).
Figure 3. Activation of Inhibitory Networks
A contrast between NOGO > GO trials in the normal state (irrespective of hands) revealed increased activity in a bilateral but predominantly right hemisphere
network including inferior frontal gyrus (IFG), posterior middle frontal gyrus (post-MFG), and inferior parietal lobule (IPL); threshold p < 0.001 uncorrected, k =
20 voxels. Plots represent the betas for L-GO and R-GO (yellow), plus L-NOGO and R-NOGO (blue) trials, respectively, in the normal, hypnosis, and simulation
conditions. Error bars represent ±1 SEM for each column. Simulation produced similar increases during normal inhibition (NOGO trials) and feigned left hand
paralysis (left GO trials), whereas hypnosis produced a very different pattern with increased activation in IFG and reduced activation in IPL in all NOGO and
GO conditions (irrespective of hands; see text for statistical comparisons). Posterior MFG was selectively activated for L-GO during hypnosis, unlike NOGO acti-
vation in the normal condition.
Neuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 867
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Hemisphere Brain region x y z Z Value
NO: NOGO > GO
R middle frontal gyrus 42 6 60 4.93
39 3 42 4.05
R supramarginal gyrus 54 42 36 4.53
L inferior frontal gyrus 54 30 0 4.43
L middle temporal gyrus 60 42 3 4.14
R middle temporal gyrus 51 21 12 4.01
R inferior frontal gyrus 57 30 24 4.08
57 24 9 3.77
L inferior frontal gyrus 42 18 6 3.78
HY: NOGO > GO
n.s.
SIM: NOGO > GO
R middle temporal gyrus 48 42 0 3.56
L middle frontal gyrus 48 24 33 3.93
R middle frontal gyrus 45 30 27 3.77
R inferior parietal lobule 51 48 42 3.71et al., 2007; Chikazoe et al., 2008; Garavan et al., 1999; Menon
et al., 2001). There was no significant difference when comparing
L-NOGO and R-NOGO trials in the normal state (whole-brain
contrast), suggesting that there was no hemispheric lateraliza-
tion for motor inhibition in the normal state.
Under hypnosis, no such increases were found for the contrast
between NOGO versus GO trials (whole brain, Table 4). However,
inspecting activity across conditions in the above regions revealed
that their response was strongly modified during hypnosis as
compared with the normal state (Figure 3), but comparable in
both the GO and NOGO conditions, resulting in a lack of significant
difference in this contrast. On the one hand, the right IFG was acti-
vated acrossall conditions during hypnosis, for bothhands (similar
to NOGO in the normal state). A 2 (state) 3 2 (hand) 3 2 (task-
condition) ANOVA on betas from IFG showed significant state 3
task-condition interaction [F(1,11) = 22.71, p = 0.001], with signifi-
cant increases for the GO condition in hypnosis versus normal
state across both hands (t11 > 2.32, p < 0.05) but no difference
between NOGO and GO in hypnosis (t11 = 0.11, n.s.). On the other
hand, activation in the right IPL was also similar across all condi-
tions during hypnosis, for both hands, but globally reduced as
compared with the NOGO conditions in normal state (Figure 3).
Asimilar23232ANOVAonbetas fromIPLalso indicatedasignif-
icant state3 task-condition interaction [F(1,11) = 78.81, p < 0.001],
with significant decreases for NOGO trials under hypnosis relative
to normal state (t11 = 3.12, p = 0.010) and no difference between
NOGO and GO under hypnosis (t11 = –0.21, n.s.). Thus, hypnosis
produced an apparent dissociation in the pattern of activation of
brain areas normally associated to inhibition, with general
increases of right IFG and general decreases of right IPL. Finally,
the right post-MFG was selectively activated during the critical
L-GO trials (see Figure 3; t11 = 2.82, p = 0.017 for L-GO versus
R-GO during hypnosis), unlike the normal state where it was
activated in NOGO trials with either hand (Table 4 and Figure 3;
t11 = –0.74, n.s., for L-GO versus R-GO in normal state).868 Neuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.By contrast, simulation of left motor paralysis produced
a similar activation of the right IFG for normal inhibition (right
and left NOGO trials) and for feigned paralysis of left-hand move-
ment (i.e., voluntary inhibition on L-GO trials; see above and
Figure 3). This was verified by pairwise contrasts relative to the
‘‘normal’’ R-GO condition during simulation (using a 10 mm
sphere centered on the peak of the main effect R + L NOGO >
R-GO in this group, xyz = 54, 30, 24): L-GO, z score = 2.98, p =
0.001; L-NOGO, z score = 2.82, p = 0.002; R-NOGO, z score =
2.53, p = 0.006, all contrasted to R-GO; but L-NOGO versus
L-GO, z score = 2.18, p > 0.01).
Finally, we also compared NOGO trials for the left versus right
hand under hypnosis (whole-brain contrast) to determine
whether motor inhibition might actually differ between hands in
this condition. For the left/paralyzed hand (L-NOGO > R-NOGO),
this contrast revealed a selective increase in activity for the left
IFG (peak xyz = –54, 27, 15; z score = 3.67, p < 0.001). However,
as shown in Figure 4, this region was activated not only by left
NOGO but also by left GO trials during hypnosis (L-GO > R-GO,
peak xyz = –48, 30, 18, z score = 3.16, p < 0.001), unlike in the
normal state (see above), suggesting a more general modulation
related to the left hand motor control rather than to inhibition only
(see above). Simulation produced an intermediate pattern
between hypnosis and normal state (Figure 4).
Taken together, these data reveal that hypnotic paralysis
induced a profound reconfiguration of activity within executive
control systems mediated by anterior prefrontal and parietal
areas across both hemispheres, which was distinct from volun-
tary simulation of paralysis and distinct from inhibition of motor
responses in the normal state.
Main Effect of Hypnotic State
For completeness, we also tested for any global change in brain
activity during hypnosis as compared with the normal state, irre-
spective of the motor task conditions. This analysis revealed
Neuron
Voluntary Inhibition during Hypnotic ParalysisFigure 4. Changes during Motor Response and Inhibition under Hypnosis
A contrast between L-NOGO and R-NOGO trials in the hypnotic state showed selective increases in left prefrontal cortex (threshold p < 0.001 uncorrected, k = 20
voxels). Plots represent the betas for L-GO and R-GO (yellow), plus L-NOGO and R-NOGO (blue) trials, respectively, in the normal, hypnosis, and simulation
conditions in the cluster defined by this contrast (peak xyz = 54, 27, 15). Error bars represent ±1 SEM for each column. Left inferior frontal gyrus showed
increased activity for all left-hand trials (GO and NOGO) during hypnosis, but for NOGO trials with both hands during normal state (see text). In the simulation
group, the same region showed a mixed pattern.general increases during hypnosis in right ACC, bilateral orbito-
frontal cortex (OFC), and bilateral extrastriate visual areas (see
Figure S1). The reverse contrast showed general decreases in
activity during hypnosis in the auditory cortex on both sides.
Functional Connectivity
Because some theoretical accounts have proposed that
hypnosis might induce a disconnection or ‘‘decoupling’’ between
prefrontal and posterior regions (Hilgard, 1974; Woody and
Farvolden, 1998), we also investigated the functional connectivity
of motor cortices with the rest of the brain as a function of state.
Since our hypnotic suggestion of left-hand paralysis indeed
produced a lack of left movement and suppressed activation of
right M1 (see above), we hypothesized that the latter region
should be selectively disconnected from regions involved in
voluntary motor control, such as premotor areas, but concomi-
tantly more coupled with other brain regions involved in the
hypnotic induction. We first selected the peak of activity in right
motor cortex (based on results for L-GO trials in normal state,
see above) and then compared the functional connectivity of
this region between hypnosis and normal state by whole-brain
contrasts (see Experimental Procedures).
Our results showed significant changes in the connectivity of
right M1 (Figure 5 and Table 5): in the normal condition, right
M1 was more connected to the right dorsal premotor cortex
and to the left cerebellum; whereas during hypnosis this region
was more connected to the right angular gyrus and left precu-
neus. Moreover, both the premotor and precuneus regions that
were differentially coupled with right M1 activity across states
overlapped with brain areas that were differentially activated
by left-hand preparation during normal state and hypnosis,
respectively (see Table 2 and Figure S2). The connectivity of right
M1 in the simulation group was similar to the connectivityobserved in the normal condition for the precuneus, the right pre-
motor cortex, and the right angular gyrus (t16 = 0.52, t16 = 0.23,
and t16 = 0.67, respectively, all n.s., see also Figure 5).
Conversely, the same analysis for left motor cortex did not
show any significant changes in connectivity between normal
state and hypnosis.
DISCUSSION
The fascinating alterations of mental functions induced by
hypnosis are unlikely to be mediated by any single brain region,
but rather involve distributed changes in brain networks support-
ing conscious will and self awareness. The neural correlates of
hypnotic phenomena have remained poorly known, and are still
rarely studied, but recent theoretical accounts proposed that
hypnosis might entail either active inhibition or disconnection
of some mental processes from executive control systems medi-
ated by anterior prefrontal and anterior cingulate areas (Egner
et al., 2005). However, these hypotheses have never been
directly tested. In line with previous PET studies reporting
a key role for ACC and OFC in hypnotic effects on pain (Rainville
et al., 1999) and motor behavior (Halligan et al., 2000a), we found
increased activity in these regions across all conditions (main
effect) but there was no task-specific modulation. This pattern
indicates an effect of ‘‘state’’ that was not directly related to
inhibitory processes underlying hypnotic paralysis, unlike previ-
ously thought (Halligan et al., 2000b; Marshall et al., 1997; Ward
et al., 2003), but likely to reflect more general attentional and
motivational factors associated with enhanced focusing and
monitoring during hypnosis. Further, by systematically
comparing different aspects of motor control (preparation,
execution, inhibition), we could demonstrate that hypnotic paral-
ysis did not result from active suppression of motor outputs byNeuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 869
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tion of paralysis. These findings argue against a selective recruit-
ment of inhibitory control systems in anterior or medial prefrontal
regions during hypnosis.
Instead, our results show that hypnosis produced distributed
changes in prefrontal and parietal areas involved in attentional
control, together with striking modifications in the functional
connectivity of M1 with other brain regions. Changes in connec-
tivity involved a reduced coupling with premotor areas but
increased coupling with the precuneus, which was also selec-
tively activated during instructions to prepare left movement
during hypnosis. Altogether, these data suggest a disconnection
of motor commands from normal voluntary processes, presum-
Figure 5. Functional Connectivity of the
Right Primary Motor Cortex
Regions showing an increase in correlated activity
with the right M1 (blue seed) during the normal
state as compared with the hypnotic state (i.e.,
right precuneus and right inferior parietal lobule,
green), and conversely a decrease in correlated
activity (i.e., right premotor cortex and left cere-
bellum, red) at a threshold p < 0.001 uncorrected,
k = 5 voxels. The betas of connectivity with rM1 are
plotted for each of these regions for the normal
state, hypnosis, and simulation condition. Error
bars represent ±1 SEM for each column.
Table 5. Functional Connectivity of Right M1
Hemisphere Brain Region x y z Z Value
NO > HYPNO
R middle frontal gyrus 27 9 66 4.03
L cerebellum 33 48 24 3.88
HYPNO > NO
L precuneus 3 69 63 3.67
R supramarginal 51 66 33 3.54
ably under the influence of brain systems
involved in executive control and self-
related imagery, as we discuss in details
below.
Modulation of Imagery and
Self-Referential Processing
Despite the suggestion of paralysis, right
M1 was still normally activated during
instructions to prepare a left-hand move-
ment under hypnosis (see Figure 1), indi-
cating that hypnosis did not produce
a complete suppression of activity in
motor pathways and did not totally elimi-
nate the representation of motor inten-
tions (Jeannerod, 2001). Hence, mecha-
nisms of hypnotic paralysis may differ
from those postulated for other psycho-
logically induced paralyses such as
hysterical conversion (Fiorelli et al., 1991; Vuilleumier, 2005)
and from neurological conditions characterized by unilateral los-
ses in movement intentions such as motor neglect (de Lange
et al., 2007; Laplane and Degos, 1983). This preserved activation
of M1 during preparation is consistent with residual motor
imagery despite paralysis (Jeannerod, 2001). In addition, selec-
tive increases in the precuneus and extrastriate visual areas were
also observed during the preparation of left-hand movements
under hypnosis, providing further support for a recruitment of
mental imagery processes in this condition.
Several hypotheses can be proposed concerning the role of
precuneus activation. First, this region is critically involved in
multisensory mental imagery and memory, particularly in relation
870 Neuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.
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Voluntary Inhibition during Hypnotic Paralysisto representations of the self (den Ouden et al., 2005; Lou et al.,
2004) and self-oriented processes (Boly et al., 2007; Cavanna
and Trimble, 2006), including experience of agency (Cavanna,
2007). Furthermore, this area was reported to be specifically
activated when envisioning future events from a first-person
perspective (Szpunar et al., 2007). This appears consistent
with the present activation during motor preparation, since the
latter condition constitutes a prospective phase during which
the subject could anticipate the upcoming action and intensify
a feeling of personal or ‘‘internal’’ control over movements rather
than a more stimulus-driven or ‘‘external’’ control of action.
Changes in precuneus activity could also mediate the change
in consciousness associated with hypnosis, typically character-
ized by reduced alertness and/or temporary distortion in repre-
sentations of the self or the environment (Crawford et al.,
1992), in agreement with dysfunctions observed in this region
during various states of altered consciousness, such as coma
(Laureys et al., 2004), vegetative states (Laureys et al., 1999),
sleep (Maquet et al., 2000), or anesthesia (Alkire et al., 1999).
In keeping with this idea, a number of previous studies reported
modifications in precuneus activity during hypnosis, including
a negative correlation with the degree of subjective absorption
(Rainville et al., 2002) and some reduction relative to the alert
resting state (Maquet et al., 1999). However, it is possible that
hypnosis might produce different modulations in precuneus
depending on the induction procedure: hypnotic states with no
specific suggestion (e.g., relaxation and absorption) tend to
reduce precuneus activity, whereas more specific suggestions
(e.g., higher or lower pain perception) tend to increase it (Rain-
ville et al., 1999). Here, we found an activation of the precuneus
specifically when instructing the subject to prepare a movement
with the left/paralyzed hand. Thus, our results do not only
confirm that precuneus activity is enhanced during hypnosis
with suggestion but also demonstrate that such increases are
specifically linked to the target of the suggestion (here the left
hand).
Alternatively, changes in precuneus activity might reflect the
role of this region in the ‘‘default mode network,’’ which is typi-
cally more active during rest with closed eyes than during active
tasks (Raichle et al., 2001). Hence, our results could be inter-
preted as a relative lack of suppression of precuneus activity
during task performance, with the subject under hypnosis
staying in a ‘‘default mode’’ when asked to prepare a movement
with his left/paralyzed hand. However, because motor prepara-
tion was preserved and reaction times with the right hand were
unchanged during hypnosis, we consider that a general alter-
ation in consciousness or reduced vigilance did not occur and
could not account for selective precuneus activity during left
movement preparation. This apparent paradox of preserved voli-
tion with concomitant changes in self consciousness might
contribute to one of the core phenomena of hypnosis, that is,
‘‘psychic dissociation’’ (Hilgard, 1974).
Most importantly, our functional connectivity analysis revealed
that a similar region in precuneus showed stronger coupling with
right M1 during left hypnotic paralysis, relative to the normal
state. Conversely, right M1 activity was less correlated with
right premotor cortex during hypnosis than during normal state.
This pattern suggests a possible neural mechanism by whichincreases in self-monitoring processes may take control over
the left-hand movements based on internal representations,
derived from hypnotic suggestions and mental imagery, in place
of the habitual responses to external stimuli that are normally
under the guidance of premotor programs.
Modulation of Inhibitory Control and Attentional
Focusing
The flexibility of human behavior is thought to be supported by
executive control systems implemented in prefrontal areas,
enabling us to deliberately and selectively focus our attention
on currently relevant information (Shallice and Burgess, 1991;
Duncan, 2001, 2006; Miller and Cohen, 2001). Consistent with
models linking hypnotic phenomena with changes in executive
control (Egner and Raz, 2007; Hilgard, 1974; Jamieson and
Sheehan, 2004; Spiegel and Spiegel, 1978; Woody and Farvol-
den, 1998), our imaging data revealed significant modulations
in several prefrontal regions as well as parietal regions associ-
ated with response selection and attention during hypnosis.
However, different effects were observed in different frontal
areas, contrasting with the normal state where these regions
generally exhibited a similar pattern of activation.
In particular, the rIFG showed striking increases across all
conditions during hypnosis as compared with the normal state
(see Figure 3), but no selective modulation as a function of move-
ment execution or suppression, even though this region is a key
component of the ‘‘braking circuit’’ normally responsible for
inhibiting prepotent or habitual actions (Aron et al., 2004b; Xue
et al., 2008). Thus, rIFG activates in various conditions requiring
a suppression of ongoing motor or cognitive programs (Brass
et al., 2005; McNab et al., 2008), including no-go (Konishi
et al., 1998; Rubia et al., 2003) or stop-signal tasks (Aron et al.,
2003; Garavan et al., 1999). Consistent with these studies, we
found that inhibitory processes mediated by the right IFG were
recruited during NOGO trials (for both hands) in the normal state
as well as during simulation of left paralysis on GO trials, indi-
cating that feigned paralysis involves voluntary inhibitory activity
in right IFG equivalent to NOGO trials. By contrast, the lack of
rIFG increases during left hypnotic paralysis on GO trials, despite
preserved motor activation during the preparation phase, clearly
demonstrates that hypnotic effects are different from voluntary
restrain and do not act through direct motor inhibition. On the
other hand, the general increases in rIFG during all task condi-
tions under hypnosis (see Figure 3) cannot be explained by an
exclusive role in motor inhibition. Instead, this pattern indicates
that executive control processes mediated by this region were
recruited by all trial types under hypnosis, which might corre-
spond to a state of enhanced monitoring or ‘‘hypercontrol’’ acti-
vated in response to every imperative event (GO or NOGO) in
this condition. We therefore propose that IFG activity might
reflect a more general self-monitoring function, or more general
changes in controlling attention and responses to external
stimuli, allowing internal mental representations generated
through the hypnotic suggestion to guide motor behavior
(perhaps via enhanced influences from precuneus), rather than
simply interrupting motor outputs for prepared actions.
A distinct region in the right post-MFG might be more directly
involved in the cancellation of prepared movements, as it showedNeuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc. 871
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either hand) and to L-GO stimuli during hypnotic paralysis (see
Figure 3), although it is unclear why no reliable increases were
seen on NOGO trials under hypnosis. Nevertheless, a similar pre-
motor region in post-MFG has been found to activate in several
motor selection tasks and is suspected to have a major a role
for abstract stimulus-response representations, allowing flexible
adjustments of behavior to changing task contingencies (Brass
et al., 2005; Chikazoe et al., 2008). MFG thus appears to have
a different function than purely inhibitory control, unlike more
anterior prefrontal regions in right IFG or medial areas in ACC
(Chikazoe et al., 2008; Downar et al., 2001). Therefore, changes
in MFG activity might reflect the formation of different task-rele-
vant motor representations during hypnosis as compared with
normal conditions. Alternatively, MFG activation might accord
with previous suggestions that some premotor areas have
a specific role to produce negative motor phenomena (Luders
et al., 1985). Hence, we hypothesize that MFG activity might be
primarily driven by the right IFG in the normal state when inhibiting
prepared movements, while the same region might be recruited
through other mechanisms in order to suppress movements
with the paralyzed hand during hypnosis.
The pattern of activation in left IFG was found to correspond to
conditions that were behaviorally most relevant or deviant (NOGO
versus GO irrespective of hand in normal state, but left versus
right hand irrespective of motor response under hypnosis), and
thus appeared to match the specific task demands associated
with the different states. This pattern is consistent with the notion
that left-sided brain areas within executive control networks
play a key role in implementing task settings (Aron et al., 2004a)
and/or selecting appropriate responses among competing
options based on current context (Koechlin et al., 2003; Simons
et al., 2005). Since left ventrolateral prefrontal areas are also
recruited during learning of new associations between visual
cues and motor responses (Passingham et al., 2000), their
recruitment during hypnosis might reflect the maintenance of
new action rules imposed by the hypnotic suggestion. This recon-
figuration of activity across bilateral prefrontal areas suggests
a switch in behavioral control settings, from an execution/inhibi-
tion scheme in the normal state to a left/right hand scheme under
hypnosis (Fiebach and Schubotz, 2006).
Additionally, parietal regions are also known to be implicated in
attentional control (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002; Raz, 2004).
Together with the rIFG, the right IPL is normally activated by
various inhibition tasks (Garavan et al., 1999, 2002; Langenecker
and Nielson, 2003; Liddle et al., 2001; Peterson et al., 2002; Rubia
et al., 2001; Sylvester et al., 2003) as well as by exogenous orient-
ing to unexpected or rare events (Corbetta and Shulman, 2002;
Kirino et al., 2000; Marois et al., 2000). Whereas the differential
responses to NOGO versus GO trials were abolished in right
IPL during hypnosis, just like in rIFG, these changes involved a
general decrease of activity across all conditions, unlike the
general increase observed in rIFG (see Figure 3). This relatively
‘‘silent’’ pattern in rIPL suggests that hypnosis induced a state
in which attention was not differentially engaged by imperative
signals, consistent with an attenuation of the normal responses
to external stimuli. Furthermore, this opposite pattern of
decreases in IPL with increases in IFG across all trial types reveals872 Neuron 62, 862–875, June 25, 2009 ª2009 Elsevier Inc.a striking dissociation between two highly interconnected
regions within attentional networks (Corbetta et al., 2008; Fox
et al., 2006) under hypnosis. We suggest that such a state of
enhanced self-monitoring coupled with a partial suppression of
responsiveness to external stimulation might contribute to the
subjective experience of a ‘‘hidden observer’’ or ‘‘dissociated
self’’ that is commonly reported under hypnosis (Hilgard, 1974).
Conclusion
By investigating mechanisms of hypnotic paralysis, our study
goes beyond previous imaging studies that focused on pain
perception and modulation of ACC by attentional factors during
hypnosis (Egner et al., 2005; Rainville et al., 1997; Raz et al.,
2005). We demonstrate that hypnosis induces the control of
action by internal representations generated through suggestion
and imagery, mediated by precuneus activity, and reconfigures
the executive control of the task implemented by frontal lobes.
These findings make an important new step toward establishing
neurobiological foundations for the striking impact of hypnosis
on mind and behavior.
EXPERIMENTAL PROCEDURES
Participants
Eighteen healthy subjects volunteered to participate in the study. They had no
past neurological or psychiatric disease and normal or corrected-to-normal
vision. These participants were selected to be highly hypnotizable, first by
screening with the Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility: Form A
(HGSHS: A [Shor and Orne, 1963]) during a group session, and then by giving
the Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale: Form C (SHSS: C) during a second
individual session. Scores ranged from 9 to 12 on these two scales. In this
second session, each participant was given a hypnotic suggestion while being
exposed to a mock scanner noise condition and instructed to rate the depth of
hypnosis on a 1-to-10 scale at several times during the session.
Stimuli
Visual stimuli included three iso-luminant pictures of hands (one grayscale,
one green, and one red), which depicted either a right or left (mirrored) hand
as seen from a dorsal view (palm down). All images were projected on a screen
and reflected on a mirror mounted on the MRI head coil, with a size of6 3 6
visual angle.
Procedure
All participants performed a modified go-nogo task using both hands. Each
trial began with a fixation cross of 500 ms, followed by a preparation cue
(PREP condition) represented by a grayscale picture of a hand (right or left),
indicating on which side to prepare the upcoming movement. After a varying
interval between 1 to 5 s, the hand picture could turn to either green or red
(for 750 ms): when green, participants had to respond as quickly as possible
by pressing a button with the corresponding hand (GO condition, 75% of
trials); but when red, the prepared movement had to be withheld (NOGO condi-
tion, 25% of trials). A visual feedback was given on all trials after a random
interval of 100–800 ms (signaling correct, incorrect, or no response detected).
All conditions were presented in blocks of 100 trials (in pseudorandomized
order), separated by a 30 s rest period at the middle of each block.
Twelve participants performed the experiment in a normal state for two
consecutive blocks and in a hypnotic state for two other consecutive blocks
(order counterbalanced). During hypnosis, subjects received a suggestion
that their left hand was paralyzed, prior to performing the task. The hypnotic
induction took place in the MRI scanner and was given by an experienced clini-
cian (A.F.) via a microphone from the MRI control room. Participants were first
instructed to close their eyes and relax, they received a suggestion that their
left hand became heavy, stiff, and progressively unable to move. Once they
Neuron
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of hypnosis, as previously trained in the prescanning session. Functional MRI
acquisition started only if ratings wereR6 (on a 1-to-10 scale). Halfway in each
block, the task was interrupted for 30 s (without stopping fMRI acquisition),
while the suggestion was consolidated and a new subjective rating was
obtained from the participant (in the hypnotic state), or a neutral encourage-
ment was given and a verbal self-report about performance was made via
the microphone (in the normal state). These ratings confirmed a reliable level
of hypnosis (R5) throughout scanning in all cases. The upper face and hands
of participants were continuously monitored by an infrared eye-tracker (ASL
LRO 450) and an MRI-compatible video camera (Philips Medical Systems),
respectively.
Six different participants performed the same task with the instruction to
simulate that their left hand was paralyzed (two blocks). After being told that
they served as controls for a study of stroke patient with hemiplegia, they
were asked to act ‘‘as if’’ they were suffering from motor weakness and unable
to move their fingers. The rest of the procedure was exactly as above.
Prior to fMRI, all participants performed the task for a short training block of
20–30 trials.
fMRI Acquisition and Analysis
MRI data were acquired on a 1.5T whole-body INTERA system (Philips
Medical Systems), using the standard head-coil configuration. For each partic-
ipant, structural images were acquired with a 3D-GRE T1-weighted sequence
(FOV = 250 mm, TR/TE/Flip = 15 ms/5.0 ms/30, matrix = 256 3 256, slice-
thickness = 1.25 mm); and functional images with a GRE EPI sequence (TR/
TE/Flip = 2500 ms/40 ms/80, FOV = 250 mm, matrix = 1283 128). Each func-
tional image comprised 32 contiguous 3.4 mm axial slices (TR = 2.5 s) oriented
parallel to the inferior edge of the occipital and temporal lobes. For each of the
four experimental blocks, a total of 266 functional images were acquired
continuously.
Functional images were analyzed using the general linear model (Friston
et al., 1998) for event-related designs in SPM2 (Wellcome Department of
Imaging Neuroscience, London, UK; http://www.fil.ion.ucl.ac.uk/spm). All
images were realigned, corrected for slice timing, normalized to an EPI-
template (resampled voxel size of 3 mm), spatially smoothed (8 mm FWHM
Gaussian kernel), and high-pass filtered (cutoff 120 s).
Statistical analyses were performed on a voxelwise basis across the whole-
brain. Individual events were modeled by a standard synthetic hemodynamic
response function (HRF). To account for residual movement artifacts after
realignment, movement parameters derived from realignment corrections
(three translations, three rotations) were entered as covariates of no interest.
Trials with errors were not included in the analysis of fMRI data. The general
linear model was then used to generate parameter estimates of activity
at each voxel (betas), for each experimental condition (PREP, GO, and
NOGO, for both hands), resulting in six regressors for each run (L-PREP,
R-PREP, L-GO, R-GO, L-NOGO, R-NOGO) in each participant. Statistical
parametric maps were generated from linear contrasts between the HRF
betas for the different conditions. Contrasts comparing the main effects
of state were obtained by standard t tests between the normal versus
hypnotic runs for a given task condition (e.g., NORMAL L-GO versus HYPNO
L-GO).
A random-effect group analysis was then conducted on contrast images
from the individual analyses, using one-sample t tests across the whole brain
(Friston et al., 1998). As standard practice, focal activations were considered
as significant at a voxel level of p < 0.001 (uncorrected) with a cluster threshold
of more than 20 voxels, unless reported otherwise. In addition, post-hoc anal-
yses were performed on selected regions of interest (i.e., to compare two
conditions for a cluster identified in a main contrast pooling across these
conditions) by using t test contrasts on the peak of activation defined by
a previous contrast and searching for the z score maxima within a 10 mm
sphere in SPM. ANOVAs and t tests were also performed on average betas
extracted from selected regions of interest (previously defined in SPM), using
standard statistics in SPSS 15.0 (SPSS Inc., Chicago, IL, USA). Repeated-
measure ANOVA was used for comparisons between hypnosis and normal
state (within-group statistics), whereas nonrepeated ANOVAs were used for
between simulation and normal state (between-group).For functional connectivity analysis, we first selected the peak of activity in
right motor cortex (M1, seed region) based on the results found for GO trials in
normal state (L-GO > L-NOGO), using a new GLM model with the signal from
a sphere of 6 mm centered on the rM1 as an additional regressor. Thus, this
new design matrix included four runs that each contained six regressors for
the six conditions (see above), plus one regressor for the time series of rM1
activity (nonconvolved with the HRF), as well as six regressors for the move-
ment realignment parameters, and one regressor for the constant session
effect in each run. We then contrasted the rM1 regressors of the two normal
state runs to the same regressors of the hypnotic state, using a paired t test
across the whole brain for each subject (with a threshold of p < 0.001 uncor-
rected and cluster extent of five voxels). A random-effect group analysis was
conducted on these individual contrast images. A similar analysis was per-
formed with a seed in left M1. Finally, we conducted the same analysis for
the simulation group and then compared the degree of connectivity of rM1
in this group with the normal state by using t tests on the average betas of
connectivity extracted from the relevant regions of interest.
Behavioral data were analyzed with Microsoft Excel and SPSS.
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